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the case before trial. I hope everyone believes that is a desirable result-for defen-
dants, courts, lawyers, and victims-in almost every situation. There will always be
cases that must go to trial, but I think it generally better for the entire system if a con-
clusion can be reached early in the process.
Finally, we ought to remain humble and remember that some of these sciences have
a lot of art involved in them-perhaps more art than science-that they may be on to-
morrow's junk heap of acceptability. Fiber analysis is an example that was mentioned
earlier that would fall into this category. Similarly, bullet lead content analysis, bite
mark analysis, and hair match testimony are all suspect. Just as a cautionary tale, do not
forget that the insanity defense for Charles Guiteau, the man who assassinated Presi-
dent Garfield in 1882, was based on phrenology, the state-of-the-art science of the time
that involved mapping bumps on the head. Even today, evidence of a smudged finger-
print with only three points of comparison instead of a full print, with 20 or more
points, already takes a jury out of the world of science and well into the world of hu-
man error. We should keep in mind our society's ability to develop new, and discard
old, sciences and technologies.
The Council obviously tried to incorporate the scientific evidence restrictions that
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [509 U.S. 579 (1993)], suggests to
courts. Unfortunately, in Massachusetts, three members of the Supreme Judicial Court
are currently suggesting that Daubert should apply only to novel evidence, which
would have the effect of grandfathering in all the junk science that has been presented
to and accepted by courts up to this time. Thus, even what constitutes science is in dis-
pute in the courts.
The Massachusetts Governor's Council Report is important in its apparent repudia-
tion of the way death is currently meted out in courts across the country. Additionally,
the Counsel has worked hard to make less flawed a human and therefore necessarily
imperfect system. In the final analysis, though, to rest the decision of who should live
and who should die on such disputed standards, procedures, and even disputed science
itself leaves the Massachusetts proposal on the cynical side of Harlan's problem of
systemic imperfection.
FORENSIC SCIENCE OR FORGEIrABLE SCIENCE?
Craig M Cooley
I am an investigator with the Office of the State Appellate Defender's Death Penalty
Trial Assistance Division ("DPTA") in Chicago, Illinois. I have been with the DPTA
for the past three years where I have worked on more than fifteen capital cases. I also
had the opportunity to work on various cases that were affected by Governor Ryan's
commutations and pardons. Prior to law school and my work with the DPTA I received
my graduate degree in forensic science at the University of New Haven.
My main research at the DPTA and during law school has dealt with forensic sci-
ence and miscarriages ofjustice. I have spent countless hours researching those injus-
tices where it appears that forensic fraud or misidentifications played a likely role in an
innocent person's wrongful conviction. After studying these injustices, principally the
capital cases, I came to the unsettling conclusion that we have two broken systems
within the criminal justice system. Not only is the capital punishment system broken, so
[Vol. 80:69
2005] PANEL THREE-THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 81
too is the forensic science system. More importantly, we essentially have a broken fo-
rensic science system attempting to support and maintain the broken capital punish-
ment system. As a result, before we can realistically consider implementing various
capital punishment reforms, significant efforts must be made to rectify the reoccurring
problems evidenced within the forensic science community.
Given this reality, I was surprised by the Committee's reliance on forensic science
given the current state of affairs in forensic science for several reasons. First, our na-
tion's crime labs are in complete disarray, especially in those states where the machin-
ery of death is most prolific. For instance, consider the innumerable problems with the
Houston Crime Lab and the Oklahoma City Crime Lab. While these two examples may
be unique given their breadth and scope, it would be foolish to assume that these two
labs stand alone when it comes to experiencing problems like forensic fraud, examiner
incompetence, or insufficient funding. To the contrary, these problems have surfaced in
crime labs throughout the country.
My second and third concerns are intertwined with one another. The notion that sci-
entific evidence is highly accurate is premised on two assumptions: (a) scientists are
performing the work, and (b) science is actually being practiced. Unfortunately, foren-
sic science is not only comprised of few scientists, there is little science in forensic
science. Put simply, forensic science has become forgettable science simply because
those who invented the so-called forensic sciences forgot the science and weren't sci-
entists.
With respect to my second concern, a distinction must be made between "scientists"
and "technicians." To guarantee objectivity, scientists design blind tests to discover
whether a certain outcome is a legitimate byproduct of the expected amalgamation of
variables, or by the chance intrusion of an impurity. Technicians, on the other hand,
merely follow prescribed routines, and are not expected to understand their underlying
fundamentals. Technicians know how, but not why. Forensic science, for the most part,
is comprised of technicians. This distinction is by no means intended to disparage the
many hard working forensic technicians and examiners that comprise the forensic sci-
ence community. Instead, it's highlighted to accentuate that forensic examiners are
unable to "think outside the box" and develop experiments to test certain (prosecuto-
rial) hypotheses, as they lack the requisite scientific education to do so. Forensic tech-
nicians must also have a firm grasp of statistics. This is essential because behind every
opinion rendered by a forensic examiner there is (or should be) a statistical basis. As a
result, forensic technicians are frequently unable to provide accurate statistics that sup-
port their opinions.
My third concern deals with the fact that there is little science in forensic science.
Notwithstanding DNA, the other individualizing techniques (e.g. fingerprints, tool-
marks, handwriting, etc.) aren't legitimate sciences. More importantly, those who in-
vented these purported sciences were law enforcement investigators who thought re-
peated assertions of individuality equated to science. Turn of the century investigators
viewed these identification techniques not so much as a means of establishing truth, but
as a useful mechanism in building a case against a suspect. The individualizing forensic
techniques are concerned with associating an item or mark located at a crime scene to
the one and only source of that item or mark to the elimination of all others in the
world. The fundamental belief held by forensic examiners is that objects or marks en-
compass sufficient disparities that on satisfactory inspection one object can't be mis-
taken for another. Individuality is supported by three premises: (1) numerous forms of
biological and physical entities exist in unique, one-of-a-kind form; (2) these entities
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leave equally distinctive traces of themselves; and (3) the methods of observation,
measurement, and inference employed by forensic examiners are adequate to link these
traces back to the one and only source that produced them.
When one seriously evaluates the three premises that support the identification sci-
ences it becomes clear that individuality isn't a legitimate scientific expectation: First,
probabilistic models cannot prove absolutes, such as that no two objects or marks are
alike. While an object or mark can never be unique per se--physical features do have
certain distinguishing qualities also known as a discrimination potential-according to
its frequency of occurrence; the more frequently it occurs, the less characteristic it is.
Ascertaining a feature's discriminatory potential, however, requires a vast amount of
data collection to identify frequency rates (i.e. base rates). This research, unfortunately,
hasn't been carried out. The second premise, which is Locard's Transfer Principle, has
never been empirically substantiated. Thus it's an untested theory awaiting verification.
The third premise deals with the "task at hand" reliability, which is whether, in this
given case, the examiner correctly matched the crime scene fingerprint (or whatever
forensic evidence is at issue) to the defendant's fingerprint. "Task at hand" reliability
can be calibrated by way of blind proficiency test. Regrettably, the forensic science
community has exhibited an unrelenting intolerance for mandatory, blind-proficiency
testing. More significantly, when proficiency testing is undertaken and the results are
made public (which is rare), they suggest that examiners, even veterans, don't fully
understand the scientific principles and procedures that they're testifying about in
court.
Given these well known problems with forensic science, the question becomes: Why
would we try to rely on forensic science at this point in time to try and rectify the vari-
ous capital punishment problems? I can only think of two reasons. One, the Governor,
like many American television viewers, has been convinced by "CSI." The forensic
science community has done a good job portraying an image of infallibility. I think
every network has a show that glorifies the forensic sciences. And the people consult-
ing for these network shows are forensic scientists. While it is good to have consultants
on shows like this, these episodes may at times go outside the boundaries of science
and reality.
The second reason I suspect the Committee puts such reliance on forensic science is
based on the work of the Innocence Project. The Innocence Project uses one of the
legitimate sciences in forensic science, DNA, to exonerate wrongly convicted individu-
als. So it's likely that the Committee thought: "If we can use science to exonerate, we
can use science to find people guilty." However, there is a fundamental difference be-
tween making an inclusionary decision and an exclusionary decision. Inclusionary de-
cisions, particularly in the identification sciences need "base rate data." As mentioned
above, you're basically making a probability statement of how likely this bite mark
came from the defendant. But we don't have any base rate data for these areas. More
importantly, very few forensic practitioners have a firm understanding of statistics.
Finally, inclusionary determinations suffer from observer effects, or examiner bias,
which is a huge problem that the forensic science community has not addressed effec-
tively.
Exclusionary decisions, on the other hand, are quite different in that they don't re-
quire statistical decision making and they generally can be made rather quickly. For
instance, if even one loop or whorl doesn't correspond to a crime scene fingerprint one
can say with absolute certainty that the two prints don't match up. Observer effect er-
rors are more vexing than deliberate fraud and misconduct, as they are often impercep-
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tible. To fall prey to these unconscious effects, examiners typically must (a) confront
an ambiguous stimulus capable of producing varying interpretations and (b) be made
aware of an expected or desired outcome.
With respect to ambiguity, the individualizing forensic sciences are top heavy with
subjectivity and uncertainty. For example, many, if not all, forensic identifications are
premised on an examiner's unyielding belief that his or her experience is all that is
required to render an absolute identification. In regards to expectation, forensic exam-
iners encounter many circumstances that undoubtedly, yet unnoticeably, lay seeds of
expectation into their frame of mind. For instance, forensic examiners simply don't
receive the physical evidence when assigned a new case. Instead, investigators fre-
quently supplement forensic examination requests with detailed reports that generally
convey superfluous information about the crime, victim[s] and/or defendant[s]. Though
investigatively relevant, this information is unnecessary when performing the over-
whelming majority of forensic identifications.
When on considers the subjective nature of forensic examinations and the impercep-
tible yet powerful influences of observer effects it should be redily apparent that the
individualization sciences (excluding DNA in certain situations) can rarely, if ever,
provide conclusive scientific proof that strongly corroborates a capital defendant's
guilt.
One of the first sentences in the Commission's Report says there can be no serious
problems with the collection, analysis, or preservation of physical evidence or associa-
tive evidence before we can hand down a capital punishment. If that is the standard,
very few defendants will be subjected to capital punishment. Let's start with the collec-
tion of physical evidence. There are no standards for death scene investigations. The
way we conduct death investigations is very similar to third world countries. Who is
collecting the evidence? The Ph.D. scientist in the lab, is not collecting and maintain-
ing the samples. In addition, the crime scene people are typically cops who want to
move into a crime-lab technician position. Thus, those collecting and preserving the
evidence that will or can send someone to death are generally law enforcement trained
cops. More importantly, there are no standards in evidence collection; most ofthe time
these individuals collect evidence on gut instinct. So the collection of evidence is very
questionable because we don't know what samples are being collected, or why they are
being collected.
For example, if you're a homicide investigator and you have investigated five homi-
cides between spouses, and the husband is always found guilty, you're going to ap-
proach that crime scene with an expectation. The investigator is going to subcon-
sciously or consciously look for evidence pointing toward the husband. So the collec-
tion of physical evidence at crime scenes is a problem that needs to be addressed
within the forensic community. How do we go about this? Do we need trained forensic
technicians or do we just let the police collect anything they find? There needs to be
some sort of systematic collection.
Beyond the issues involved in the collection of evidence, there are also preservation
issues. I've worked three capital cases where the main evidence or a large amount of
the evidence was lost or misplaced. For example, I had a case that involved an arson
where a trailer home burned down and killed two children. One would think that they
would have saved the trailer so that somebody could examine the bum patterns. The
defendant claimed that it wasn't arson, but that it was accidentally caused. If preserved,
the court could have evaluated the defendant's claim. But, the trailer was destroyed the
day after the fire. Another case I am familiar with involved a prosecutor who had to
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"de-death" the case because, literally, 75% of the evidence was lost by a little county
police department. This points out a separate issue: the big Massachusetts State Police
or the Illinois State Police generally do great jobs at crime scenes compared to the rural
county police departments. Not every agency can be like Dr. Selavka's or the Illinois
State Police.
My last concern deals with the mounting evidence that suggests unsubstantiated fo-
rensic techniques and rogue forensic examiners have played significant roles in a grow-
ing number of wrongful convictions. The current-statistics demonstrate that forensic
science is a close second behind eyewitness identification as the foremost factor in
capital and non-capital wrongful convictions. The mounting evidence of forensically
caused injustices demands that we investigate whether unproven forensic techniques or
the actions of rogue forensic examiners have actually played a role in or led to the ul-
timate injustice--executing an innocent person. Many contend there is strong evidence
indicating that poor or fraudulent forensic science led to the wrongful executions of
Roger Coleman, Joseph O'Dell, Malcom Rent Johnson, and Todd Willingham.
Serious capital punishment reform can only truly begin once the forensic science
system has undergone a complete metamorphosis. Forensic science reform must start
and end with two crucial elements-funding and science. During the past decade, the
financial incapacities of our nation's crime labs have been repeatedly exposed. Inade-
quate funding has led to shoddy crime labs employing antiquated technology. This in
turn has caused massive backlogs with respect to DNA and other forms of forensic
testing. Similarly, insufficient funding has caused a high amount of turn over in our
nation's crime labs because of poor salaries. Forensic science undergraduate and
graduate education has also been negatively impacted by inadequate funding. Conse-
quently, if our nation's criminal justice systems expect crime labs to be institutions of
science and forensic practitioners to be meticulously driven and analytically nimble
scientists who can carry out the necessary empirical research that can substantiate (or
invalidate) the various claims made by forensic examiners, federal and state govern-
ments must start to funnel more funding into the forensic science community
OPEN DISCUSSION
BIEBER I'd like to respond briefly to one of Mr. Pokorak's points that I
can't agree with. Based on my own experience with homicide
cases, some very bright people, including licensed physicians,
have been convicted of homicides. They were very careful, but
not careful enough, with disposing of key associative or physical
evidence. So I don't think, given my experience of more than a
decade working on a lot of homicide cases, that I would agree
that there is an educational difference in those that commit seri-
ous crimes vis-A-vis evidence.
But I'd also like to go back to Mr. Cooley's comments because I
think, while I may not disagree with some of his concerns about
the state of affairs in science as it's applied to forensic investiga-
tions, I think that's precisely why we have these recommenda-
tions in the Report. I would disagree with Mr. Cooley's catego-
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